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1 As the record indicates, Learnball is a teaching method of which Marwood is a
fervent advocate.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM:
As we write for the parties only, we do not extensively set out the
background of this case.  Lindy Marwood brought this suit against the Elizabeth Forward
School District, J. Paul Mueller, Timothy Petty, William Boucher, Edward Campbell, Jr.,
Joseph Connolly, Carol Druga, William Greenwald, Laurie MacDonald, Steven
Raczkowski, Lori Wojcik, Jay McElravy, Janet Haymon, and Jennifer Melliton
(collectively hereinafter “EFSD”), alleging that EFSD violated her constitutional rights
under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Specifically, Marwood alleges that EFSD violated the First Amendment by
retaliating against her because of her advocacy in favor of Learnball1 outside the
classroom and that EFSD violated the Equal Protection Clause by disciplining her for her
alleged use of Learnball in the classroom.  The record shows that after Marwood admitted
using Learnball in the classroom, EFSD terminated her employment, but this decision was
rescinded.  The District Court granted summary judgment for EFSD, and we affirm.
I.
A.  
Marwood first argues that EFSD violated her rights under the First Amendment. 
Specifically, she claims that EFSD’s reason for disciplining her for allegedly using
Learnball in the classroom was to retaliate against her out-of-the-classroom advocacy for
Learnball.  A public employee’s First Amendment retaliation claim is evaluated under a
three-step test.  First, the employee must establish that the activity in which she engaged
was protected by showing that it involved a matter of public concern.  See Baldassare v.
New Jersey, 250 F.3d 188, 195 (3d Cir. 2001).  After meeting this threshold, the plaintiff
needs to demonstrate that her interest in the speech “outweighs the state’s countervailing
interest as an employer in promoting efficiency of the public services it provides through
its employees.”  Id.  If these two factors are established, the plaintiff must then show a
causal nexus between the protected activity and the retaliatory action.  See id. (“If these
criteria are established, plaintiff must then show the protected activity was a substantial or
motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory action.”).  Finally, the employer can rebut the
claim by showing that it would have made the same decision regardless of the protected
activity.  Id.  
2  EFSD’s argues that Marwood did not even establish that she engaged in a
protected activity.  We, however, do not need to reach that question here.
Assuming that Marwood’s advocacy of Learnball outside of school was protected
conduct and that Marwood’s interest in it outweighs EFSD’s interest in promoting
efficiency,2 Marwood’s claim must still fail.  The record evidence simply does not support
Marwood’s contention that she was disciplined for the protected activity.  In fact,
everything in the record indicates that Marwood was disciplined for admitting to using
banned techniques, i.e., Learnball, within the classroom.  Marwood can point us to
nothing that indicates that her advocacy was a substantial motivating factor in her
discipline.  Accordingly, the District Court’s grant of EFSD’s motion for summary
judgment on this claim will be affirmed.
B.
Next Marwood argues that the District Court erred by granting EFSD
summary judgment on her Equal Protection Clause claim.  She alleges that EFSD violated
her rights under the Equal Protection Clause by subjecting her to discipline.  Specifically,
she argues that she was treated differently than other similarly situated teachers in that she
used the same classroom teaching techniques as they did but that she was disciplined
because she described her teaching method as Learnball.
The Supreme Court has stated that a successful equal protection claim can be
brought by a “class of one” where a “plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally
treated differently from others similarly situated” and there is no adequate basis for the
disparate treatment.  Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).  Where no
fundamental right is impinged and where no suspect classification is used, the difference
in treatment need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.  See Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (discussing the general rational
basis rule and noting the exceptions for fundamental rights and suspect classifications).
Under these standards, Marwood’s equal protection claim fails.  First, nothing in
the record indicates that she was treated differently from other teachers who violated
EFSD’s Classroom Management Techniques.  As Marwood has stressed, Learnball is a
package of classroom management techniques, some of which – for example, dividing the
students into teams – are not at all uncommon.  In response to a question, Marwood
admitted that she used Learnball in the classroom.  Marwood had not identified any
evidence in the record that any other teacher admitted using Learnball or that any other
teacher used the entire package of techniques that Learnball encompasses.  The mere fact
that some other teachers may have used some of those techniques does not mean that their
situation is entirely comparable to Marwood’s.  As a result, EFSD had a rational basis for
treating Marwood differently.  Given all this, we affirm the District Court’s grant of
summary judgment to EFSD on the Equal Protection Clause claim. 
IV.
We have reviewed Marwood’s arguments and see no grounds for reversal. 
3  Judge Becker concurs with the understanding that, while EFSD’s Classroom
Management Techniques directive prohibited only a small fraction of the techniques
comprising the Learnball system as set out in the Learnball Teamwork Handbook,
Marwood has not created a genuine issue of material fact with respect to her assertion that
EFSD disciplined her despite knowledge that her in-classroom practice of Learnball was
limited to a fully permitted subset of Learnball techniques.
Therefore, we affirm the order of the District Court.3
  
